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Abstract In this paper we evaluate the effective-
ness of R&D tax incentives in Quebec, using
manufacturing firm data from 1997 to 2003 origi-
nating from R&D surveys, annual surveys of
manufactures and administrative data. The estimated
price elasticity of R&D is –0.10 in the short run and
–0.14 in the long run, with slightly higher elasticities
for small firms than for large firms. We show that
there is a deadweight loss associated with level-based
R&D tax incentives that is particularly acute for large
firms. For small firms it is not sizeable enough to
suppress the R&D additionality, at least not for quite
a number of years after the initial tax change.
Incremental R&D tax credits do not suffer from this
deadweight loss and are from that perspective
preferable to level-based tax incentives.
Keywords Price elasticity of R&D  Quebec 
R&D tax credits
JEL Classifications O32  O38  H25  H50 
C23  L26
1 Introduction
Many countries rely on a policy of R&D tax
incentives to spur R&D in the private sector. In
some countries, the budget allocated to this policy is
substantive. Canada is one of these countries. In
2006, the Canadian federal government spent about
$3 billion a year on its R&D tax incentives program
(Finance Canada 2007). Among the Canadian prov-
inces, Que´bec has been the most generous in its R&D
tax incentives for many years. In 2005, provincial
payments for fiscal assistance amounted to 538
million dollars. Tax incentives have the virtue of
being more neutral in the type of firms and projects
funded than measures of direct R&D support in the
form of grants and subsidies, letting private business
determine the projects and the amount of R&D. This
virtue could also be seen as a weakness, in so far as it
might be socially preferable to steer R&D towards
projects with high spillovers. Many countries try to
focus their support on small and medium-size enter-
prises, which are, more than big firms, plagued by the
market failure of financing intangible investment in
the presence of information asymmetries. As firms
rely more on internal funds than on external debt and
equity for financing their investments, especially
R&D investments, small firms might be more finan-
cially constrained than large firms.1
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A number of studies have been done to evaluate
the effectiveness of tax incentives in making firms
spend more on R&D. The usual evaluation consists in
checking whether there is R&D additionality, in the
sense that private firms increase their R&D expendi-
tures by more than it costs the government to support
the tax incentives program. If per dollar of govern-
ment support less than one dollar of additional private
R&D gets spent by business, then public support
partially crowds out private funding for R&D. The
evaluation of the so-called ‘‘bang for the buck’’ is a
rough cost–benefit analysis that generally does not
take into account factors like spillovers, indirect tax
returns, administration costs and the opportunity cost
of spending taxable income on R&D support.
In the literature there are two approaches to the
evaluation of the effectiveness of R&D tax incen-
tives. The first approach estimates the treatment
effect by constructing counterfactuals, instrumenting
the treatment, comparing experimental and treated
firms before and after the introduction of a policy
change, or by comparing firms that are close to a
discontinuity in the treatment design. Matching
estimators compare the average R&D effort of firms
that receive R&D tax credits with the average R&D
of firms that do not but that are otherwise similar, in
particular in having the same likelihood of receiving
R&D tax credits (Czarnitzki et al. 2004; Duguet
2008). Instrumental variable estimators instrument
the treatment by regressing it on a certain number of
explanatory variables (Cappelen et al. 2008) or by
controlling for the selected firms that know about
R&D tax incentives and apply for it (Corchuelo
Martı´nez-Azu´a and Martı´nez-Ros 2008). Difference-
in-difference estimators compare the R&D of firms in
the reference and treated group before and after a
policy change, in this case a new feature in R&D tax
incentives (Cornet and Vroomen 2005). Regression
discontinuity design compares the R&D of firms that
are affected or unaffected by an exogenous discon-
tinuity in the treatment function, for example just
below and just above a ceiling in the conditions for
being eligible to receive R&D tax credits (Haegeland
and Moen 2007).
The second approach is based on a structural
model deriving from some kind of optimization
objective a demand for an R&D equation that
depends inter alia on a user cost of R&D that is
itself a function of R&D tax credit parameters
(Bernstein 1986; Hall 1993; Bloom et al. 2002;
Mairesse and Mulkay 2004). The structural modeling
approach permits simulations of the effects of future
tax changes and allows distinguishing between short-
run and long-run effects. Given the endogeneity of
the amount of R&D tax credits received and a
possible distributed lag specification, instrumental
variable estimations are used.
This study evaluates the effectiveness of the R&D
tax incentives program in the province of Que´bec. We
rely on a modeling of factor demand similar to the
ones adopted in studies that have opted for an
estimation of a factor demand model for R&D with
R&D tax parameters included in the user cost of R&D
(as in Bloom et al. (2002), Mairesse and Mulkay
(2004), Dagenais et al. (2004) and Haegeland and
Moen (2007)). We construct an observational specific
B-index that enters the user cost of capital and that
reflects the various changes over time and across firms
in the R&D tax credit scheme in Quebec and in
Canada. As opposed to most other studies, we have
access to administrative data capturing the real R&D
tax support received by firms operating in the
province of Quebec. For a survey of the empirical
literature on R&D tax incentives, see Hall and van
Reenen (2000) and Mohnen (2000). For previous
work on Canadian firms, see Bernstein (1986), Lebeau
(1996), Department of Finance Canada and Revenue
(1997), Dagenais et al. (2004), Czarnitzki et al.
(2004) and Parsons and Phillips (2007).
The originality of this study is that it exploits the
actual R&D tax credits received by every firm instead
of just relying on the statutory tax rates and eligibility
conditions and attributing tax incentives to every
eligible firm. Indeed, many firms may either not know
of the existence of tax incentives (especially small
firms) or decide not to apply for R&D tax credits
because of administration costs, inexperience or
apprehension about dealing with the tax authorities.
The second advantage of using the observed pay-
ments is that it does not oblige us to collect data on
certain types of R&D, like cooperative R&D, that
would be difficult to get. The third advantage has to
do with the fact that in the R&D surveys, firms
operating in more than one province may not always
split their R&D by province, whereas from the
administrative data, the provincial figures are
declared automatically. Few studies in the literature
have been able to make use of the actual payments of
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tax incentives (Brouwer et al. 2002; Haegeland and
Moen 2007; de Jong and Verhoeven 2007; Duguet
2008).
Since the tax support is more generous towards
small and medium-sized enterprises, it is of interest to
compare the effectiveness of this policy for SMEs
and large enterprises. Lokshin and Mohnen (2007)
report that small firms (with less than 200 employees)
are more sensitive to R&D tax incentives than large
firms in The Netherlands. Small firms are likely to be
more reactive to changes in R&D tax incentives (at
least if they actually apply for them) as they have
more difficulty in financing their R&D. They have
little collateral, they may be young firms with little to
show in terms of success, and they may not even have
patents to signal their capability to innovate. The
estimation of the model and the evaluation of the
program in terms of R&D additionality will be done
separately for both types of firms. We want to
investigate whether the same holds for firms in
Quebec.
The article is organized as follows. Section 1
provides an overview of the R&D tax incentives in
Quebec. Section 2 explains the construction of the
panel of firm data resulting from the merger of three
data sources. Section 3 sketches the structural model
of demand for R&D from which we shall estimate the
price elasticity of R&D. Section 4 presents and
comments on the estimation results. Section 5 pre-
sents some simulation analyses of R&D tax
experiments to calculate the ratio of additional
R&D per dollar of tax expenditure for different
modules of the R&D tax credit and to show
differences in the effectiveness of R&D tax incen-
tives for small and large firms.
2 Tax treatment in Quebec
It should be noted that fiscal measures to support
innovative activities other than R&D have also been
implemented in Quebec. This is the case for the
measures set up with respect to information technol-
ogy development centres (ITDCs) and marketplaces
for the new economy (MNEs) and other measures
related to the knowledge-based economy such as the
refundable tax credit for E-commerce solutions and
the refundable tax credit for technological adaptation
services. This study, however, focuses only on R&D
fiscal measures, and we present below the fiscal
measures that took place in Quebec in the last 3
decades, that is to say, the SR&DE refundable tax
credit, the super-deductions for R&D and the refund-
able tax credit based on the increase in R&D
expenditures.2
Table 1 summarizes the estimated cost of the
various fiscal measures in support of R&D that are in
order:
2.1 The refundable tax credit for scientific
research and experimental development
(SR&ED) (1983)
This tax credit is the main R&D fiscal incentive in
Quebec. Introduced in 1983, it was the first fiscal
measure aimed at R&D in Quebec. As revealed in the
Appendix, the SR&ED has been modified a few times.
At the beginning it was essentially based on the
salaries of researchers. Later on, Quebec’s govern-
ment put emphasis on both human capital and more
2 As firms claiming R&D tax credits in Quebec are also tax
claimants at the federal level of government, Revenu Que´bec
arranged with the federal taxation agency, the Canada Revenue
Agency, to apply the same definition for eligible R&D
activities. Furthermore, to ensure the uniformity in its appli-
cation at both the provincial and federal level, QR&ED are
solely determined by the Canada Revenue Agency. This
definition complies with the guidelines of the OECD Frascati
Manual (OECD 2002). More specifically, Quebec’s Taxation
Act defines ‘‘scientific research and experimental develop-
ment’’ by the systematic investigation or search that is carried
out in a field of science or technology by means of (1) basic
research or applied research undertaken for the advancement of
scientific knowledge or (2) experimental development under-
taken for the purpose of achieving technological advancement
for the purpose of creating new, or improving existing,
materials, products, devices or processes, including incremen-
tal improvements thereto.
It includes work undertaken directly in support of R&D,
where it is commensurate with the needs of such research or
experimental development and corresponds to engineering,
design, operations research, mathematical analysis, computer
programming, data collection, testing and psychological
research. However, it excludes work undertaken in one of the
following: market research or sales promotion; quality control
or routine testing of materials, products, devices or processes;
research in the social sciences or the humanities; prospecting,
exploring or drilling for, or producing, minerals, petroleum or
natural gas; the commercial production of a new or improved
material, device or product, or the commercial use of a new or
improved process; style changes; or routine data collection.
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intense cooperation between business, universities and
research centres in designing the tax credit. This led to
the following four measures:
(1) The refundable tax credit for salaries and wages
of researchers
It still represents the major component (more than
95% in the last years) of the overall fiscal incentives
in Quebec. The tax credit can be claimed by
corporations that conduct R&D activities in Quebec
or that have such activities carried out in Quebec on
their behalf. For example, in 2003 corporations could
claim a refundable tax credit that amounts to 17.5%
on the salaries and wages they pay in Quebec in a
given taxation year. However, for the first $2,000,000
of annual salaries and wages paid in a given taxation
year, the rate of the tax credit is as follows:3
• 37.5% in the case of SMEs;4
• between 37.5 and 17.5%, in the case of corpora-
tions with assets between $25 and $50 million. A
linear reduction in the rate of the tax credit (from
37.5 to 17.5%) is applied with respect to asset
increase according to the following formula:
35% - {[(A - 25,000,000 $) x 17.5%]/25,000,000 $},
A being the corporation’s assets;
• 17.5%, in the case of corporations with assets of
$50 million or more.
(2) The refundable tax credit for university research
or research carried out by a public research
centre or a research consortium
This tax credit permits firms that conclude a
university research contract with an eligible university
entity, a public research centre or a research consor-
tium to claim a refundable credit of 35% of the eligible
R&D expenditures. In the case where the research is
done by an eligible university entity, a public research
centre or a research consortium that is not affiliated to
the taxpayer, 20% is subtracted from the eligible
expenditures in calculating the tax credit. Entitlement
to such tax credits needs prior authorization.
(3) The refundable tax credit for pre-competitive
research
Under this scheme, corporations that enter into a
cooperative agreement with non-affiliated corpora-
tions to carry out work on their own or to have work
carried out on their behalf, under a pre-competitive
research project, a catalyst project or an environmental
technology innovation project, may claim a refundable
tax credit of 35% of the eligible R&D expenditures
incurred in Quebec. Again the cooperative agreement
needs to be authorized by the government.
(4) The dues or contributions paid to a research
consortium
A corporation that is a member of a recognized
research consortium may claim a refundable tax
Table 1 Evolution of the estimated cost of fiscal incentives aimed at R&D in Quebec, 1997–2005
Millions of dollars
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Scientific research and experimental development
Salaries of researchers 319 326 383 372 506 566 525 495 510
University research 7 6 6 7 8 7 6 6 6
Other 21 19 29 28 24 25 23 22 22
Super-deductions for R&D – – – 55 44 – – – –
Credit based in the increase in R&D expenditures – – f 25 45 41 41 18 –
Total R&D tax credits 347 351 418 487 627 639 596 541 538
(–) The measure did not apply that year
(f) The tax cost is less than CAN $2 million
Sources: Ministe`re des Finances, Que´bec, 2005
3 See the Appendix for the history of R&D tax credit rates in
Quebec.
4 Quebec’s Taxation Act defines a corporation as a SME, a
business with asset, including those of associated corporation,
less than 25 million. In addition, the business must not be
controlled by one or more non-residents of Canada.
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credit of 35% of its total fees or dues paid to a
research consortium to conduct in Quebec R&D
related to its activities.5
2.2 The super-deductions for R&D (1999–2000)
Introduced in March 1999 and withdrawn a year
later,6 the super-deductions for R&D were an alter-
native to the refundable SR&ED tax credits. Firms
could choose between the refundable tax credit and
the super-deduction. Firms with sufficient income
were better off choosing super-deductions in order to
reduce their eligible business income to zero, and
those with an operating loss were better off choosing
the refundable tax credits. Firms choosing the super-
deductions could reduce substantially their net
investment cost because the federal government
applied different rules in the treatment of refundable
tax credits and super-deductions for R&D. For
example, the net cost incurred by an SME for a
$100 wage expenditure would be only $9 in the case
of super-deductions compared to $27 if a tax credit
were claimed. The super-deductions were withdrawn
after one fiscal year when the federal government
decided to apply the same rules in the treatment of
refundable tax credits and super-deductions for R&D.
2.3 The refundable tax credit based on the
increase in R&D expenditures (1999–2004)
This tax credit was announced by the government of
Quebec along with the super-deductions in the budget
speech of March 1999. It was implemented for a 5-
year period as part of the effort to increase the ratio of
R&D expenditures to GDP to the average perfor-
mance of the G7 countries. The credit applied only to
SMEs, i.e., companies with assets below $25 million.
Under this tax credit, SMEs could claim an additional
15% tax credit on the eligible R&D expenditures
exceeding a reference amount equal to the average
R&D expenditures for the preceding 3 years. SMEs
that opted for super-deductions could also benefit
from this tax credit with an additional deduction of
190% of their eligible R&D expenditures.
3 Data
The dataset used in this study results from the
matching of three different microdata files: the survey
on Research and Development in Canadian Industry
(RDCI), the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM)
and administrative data from Revenu Que´bec.
The RDCI survey is a firm-level survey conducted
on an annual basis by Statistics Canada. Its sampling
frame comprises all Canadian firms known or
believed to perform or fund R&D. Since 1997, only
firms performing or funding more than $1 million in
R&D are surveyed. For all the other firms, the data
are extracted from administrative data from Canada
Revenue Agency (CRA).7 The Annual Survey of
Manufactures (ASM)8 is an annual survey conducted
by Statistics Canada that collects data on employ-
ment, wages, total cost of materials, total sales of
manufactured products, inventories, value added by
manufacturing and capital expenditures. It also
provides other principal industrial statistics such as
energy consumption and information on commodities
consumed, produced and shipped. Contrarily to the
RDCI survey described above that collects and
reports data at the company or enterprise level, the
reporting unit in the case of the ASM survey is the
establishment. More specifically, the universe of this
survey consists of all establishments primarily
engaged in manufacturing activities, that is, all
establishments classified in sectors 31, 32 and 33
under the North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS). Two methods are used to collect
data, the data collected directly from firms’ respon-
dents by questionnaires and the data obtained from
administrative files from Canada Revenue Agency.
Administrative data from Revenu Que´bec (ADRQ)
comprises records of the amounts of SR&ED or other
fiscal incentives to R&D effectively received by
R&D performers located in Quebec or having had
R&D conducted on their behalf in Quebec. This is a
slight difference compared to the target population of
5 There can be no double-counting: a firm may only claim one
type of tax credit per dollar spent on R&D.
6 In Table 1, it appears in 2 years because firms use different
fiscal years.
7 For firms with less than 1 million of R&D expenditures, the
R&D data come from Revenue Canada for firms that claim
R&D federal tax credits. We have no information about
small R&D performers that claim no R&D tax credits and that
might nevertheless have some R&D expenditures.
8 Starting in 2004, the Annual Survey of Manufactures has
been amalgamated with the Annual Survey of Forestry to form
the Annual Survey of Manufactures and Logging (ASML).
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Statistics Canada RDCI survey described above,
which does not include firms that contract out their
R&D activities. However, Statistics Canada and
Revenu Quebec both use the same definition for
SR&ED. The reporting unit in the present dataset is
the provincial-enterprise, which is the same as in the
case of the RCDI survey data of Statistics Canada.
Matching was performed at the level of provincial-
enterprises.9 The three files contained only firms
located in Quebec. Matching proceeded in two steps:
the RDCI data from Statistics Canada was matched to
the fiscal data from Revenu Que´bec, and the resulting
file was then matched to the ASM data from Statistics
Canada. Another difficulty was due to the fact that the
data correspond to different levels of aggregation.
While the RCDI-ADRQ matched data are at the
provincial–enterprise level, the ASM data are at the
establishment level. To solve this problem, we
grouped the establishments in the ASM data file by
provincial-enterprises prior to performing the match-
ing in the cases of multi-establishments enterprises.
We decided to discard all cases of mergers and
acquisitions. The data on the fiscal support received
from the Federal government were constructed by
using the official statutory rates.10
Breaking R&D performers by size class in the
manufacturing sector between 1997 and 2003, data
show that most of the R&D tax credit applications
come from small firms but that the large firms get the
greater part of the amount of attributed tax credits. As
shown in Table 2, more than 65.3% of all tax
claimants are small firms (0 to 50 employees) making
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9 The notion of ‘‘provincial-enterprise’’ is used to designate all
establishments of a given enterprise within a province and in
the same industry as identified by the 4-digit NAICS 1997.
10 The main difficulty encountered in matching the RDCI/
ADRQ and ASM datasets is that they do not have a unique
identifier. While Statistics Canada uses the company number to
identify establishments in the RCDI file, Revenu Quebec uses a
different identifier called NEQ (nume´ro d’entreprise du
Que´bec). However, since the file from Statistics Canada
includes the names and addresses of the surveyed firms, the
NEQ was obtained from the registry of enterprises from
Quebec’s Inspector General of Financial Institutions (IGIF).
We were confronted with the problem that the company names
could sometimes differ because of translation or transcript
errors. After 2000, at least 93% of the firms in the RDCI/
ADRQ file could be matched with the ASM file; before 2000
only 69–77% of the firms could be matched. In terms of total
R-D, the totals from RDCI and the matched data hardly differ.
96 R. Baghana, P. Mohnen
123
However, large firms that represent only 3.6% of tax
claimants get more than 37.5% of the total amount of
attributed tax credits. The tax credit for salaries of
researchers was the most important program account-
ing for at least 75% of the total attributed tax credits.
The tax credit for university research shows no
significant differences across size classes. Tax credit
for pre-competitive research was used more often by
small and medium-sized firms (less than 500 employ-
ees). The reason is that because of limited capacity of
funding a research project, firms enter into partner-
ship contracts for pre-competitive research projects
(or to have the project done on their behalf). This tax
credit and the credit for university research, however,
represented only 0.9 and 0.6%, respectively, of the
total attributed tax credit over the sample period.
Concerning the tax credit for dues or contributions
paid by corporations to a research consortium, data
show that the majority of beneficiaries were firms
with more than 500 employees.
Table 2 also shows the non-negligible use of other
fiscal incentives such as the super-deductions for
R&D and the tax credit based on the increase in R&D
expenditures. Even though these fiscal measures
lasted only 1 and 5 years respectively, corresponding
claims totaled 4.0 and 4.5%, respectively, of the total
attributed tax credits over the sample period.
4 Model
The model from which we estimate the elasticity of
R&D with respect to its user cost is the same as the
one used in Lokshin and Mohnen (2007). In a
nutshell, we start from a CES approximation to the
true production function for firm i at time t (as in
Chirinko et al. 1999; Hall and van Reenen 2000;
Mairesse and Mulkay 2004):
Qit ¼ FtðKit; XitÞ ¼ c bKqit þ 1  bð ÞXqit½ m=q ð1Þ
where Qit is the output, Kit is the end of period R&D
stock, Xit is the other inputs, and c (a scale factor), b
(the distribution parameter), m (a measure of the
returns to scale) are parameters to be estimated that
characterize the technology, as well as q that enters
the expression for the elasticity of substitution (r)
between R&D stock and the other inputs and is given
by r ¼ 1= 1 þ qð Þ 0: In a static model of profit
maximization, the optimal amount of R&D capital in
logarithms would be given by11
kit ¼ a þ rþ 1  rð Þ=mð Þqit  r uR;it  pQ;it
 
: ð2Þ
where uR,it is the logarithm of the user cost of R&D
and pQ,it the unobservable output price. Following
Klette and Griliches (1996), we assume a price
elasticity of e[ 0 in absolute value of the demand for
the output of firm i relative to industry demand:
qit  qIt ¼ e pQ;it  pIt
  ð3Þ
where qIt is the industry demand and pIt the industry
price in period t. Substituting (3) into (2) yields the
long-run relationship
kit ¼ a þ /vit  r uR;it  pI;it
 þ cqI;t ð4Þ
where / ¼ rþ l 1  rð Þ=m, and c ¼ 1  lð Þ
1  rð Þ=v, and vit is the nominal output deflated by
the industry output price deflator.
Investment is composed of a replacement investment
(Rrit) and a net investment (R
n
it). The former is propor-
tional to the R&D stock at the beginning of the period:
Rrit ¼ dKi;t1. The latter represents the change in the










We approximate the discrete growth rate in the
R&D stock by a log difference and assume that the
growth rate in the R&D stock follows a partial
adjustment mechanism
kt  kt1 ¼ k kt  kt1
  ð6Þ
which after substitutions can be rewritten as
kt  kt1 ¼ k kt  kt1
 þ 1  kð Þk kt1  kt2
 
þ 1  kð Þ2k kt2  kt3
 þ    ð7Þ
Changes in the R&D stock are therefore expressed as
a weighted sum of changes in the desired R&D stocks
in the past. We can now rewrite (5) as
Rit
Ki;t1
¼ dþ / k dvit
I  1  kð ÞL  r
k duRit  dpIitð Þ
I  1  kð ÞL
þ c k dqIit
I  1  kð ÞL þ eit ð8Þ
11 Logarithmically transformed variables are denoted by small
letters.





¼ kdþ 1  kð Þ Ri;t1
Ki;t2
þ /k dvit
 rk duRit  dpIitð Þ þ ckdqIit
þ eit  1  kð Þei;t1
  ð9Þ
We have appended a random error term in (9) to
account for random unobserved disturbances. Any
individual effect present in (4) is removed by the
first-differencing. The error term follows a MA(1)
process. Because of the simultaneity between the user
cost and the amount of R&D we have to instrument
for the contemporaneous change in the user cost of
R&D. The short-run elasticity of R&D stock with
respect to the user cost of R&D is given by -rk. The
long-run elasticity is given by -r.
5 Estimation results
Table 3 gives the magnitude of the variables appear-
ing in the final estimating Eq. 9. The R&D stock has
been constructed by the perpetual inventory method,
the starting value being obtained by dividing the
initial R&D flow by the sum of the R&D depreciation
rate (taken to be 15%) and the growth rate of R&D
flow during the sample period. The R&D stock is on
average five times bigger than the R&D flow. All
nominal values are converted in 2002 prices by the
appropriate deflators. The R&D deflator is computed
as the average of the GDP deflator and the monthly
wage index of the manufacturing sector in Quebec
(Statistics Canada, Cansim, Table 281-0039). The
industry price and quantity used to eliminate the firm
output in Eq. 3 is from the NAICS 3-digit industry in
which the firm has its major activity.
In Table 4 we present the GMM estimates for all
firms in our sample, and separately for the large firms
(with more than 250 employees) and the small firms
(with less than 250 employees). As we can see, most
of the firms in our sample are small, benefiting from
favourable R&D tax credits. We have relatively few
large firms in our sample. Two explanatory variables
have to be instrumented: the user cost of R&D, which
may vary with the amount of R&D, and the lagged
dependent variable, which is correlated with the
MA(1) error term. Without instrumenting, i.e. esti-
mating Eq. 9 by ordinary least squares, yields a short-
run price elasticity -rk of -0.01 (non-significant).
We then turn to the GMM estimations. As instru-
mental variables we use the one-period lagged level
of the user cost of R&D (in log), the two-period
lagged level of the dependent variable, and the
contemporaneous R&D deflator, interest rate and tax
credit on researchers’ salaries in Quebec.
Table 3 Variable constructions and descriptive statistics
Variable Construction All firms Large firms Small firms
R/K Ratio of R&D flow to R&D stock, constructed as own R&D

















































Note: The descriptive statistics are sample means for the years 1997–2003. The base year is 2002
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The rank test of underidentification rejects the null
hypothesis that the matrix of reduced form coeffi-
cients has less than full rank, and hence points to the
relevance of the instruments and to the identification
of the model with those instruments. Regarding the
weakness of the instruments, the F-test based on
Shea’s partial R2 is greater than 10 for the first-stage
significance of the exogenous variables in explaining
the user cost of R&D, but less than 10 in explaining
the lagged dependent variable. However, in the
presence of two endogenous variables we should
rather use the Cragg-Donald statistic (the minimum
eigenvalue of the first stage F-statistic matrix) and the
Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values for testing
whether the instruments are weak (1) in terms of
relative bias, i.e. whether the maximum relative
squared bias of the IV estimator relative to the OLS
estimator is at least some value b, and (2) in terms of
bias in the Wald test size, i.e. whether the actual size
of the test is at least some value b above the nominal
level of the test. At the 5% level, we reject the null
hypothesis that the instruments bias the IV estimate
relative to the OLS estimate by more than 30%, and
we cannot reject the null that the bias in the size of
the Wald test exceeds 25%. With our instruments the
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is accepted.
Table 4 Estimation of R&D Eq. 9 by GMM
Parameters/statistics OLS GMM
All firms All firms Large firms Small firms
























































Test of underidentification Kleibergen-Paap





Tests of weak identification: F-test of Shea’s
partial R2 for
duRit - dpIit 107.55 64.30 63.21
Ri,t - 1/Ki,t - 2 11.58 6.11 9.52
Cragg-Donald F statistic (at 5% level of confidence) 5.893 5.371 4.986
IV relative bias to OLS Rejected [ 30% Rejected [ 30% Rejected [ 30%
Size bias Not rejected [ 30% Not rejected [ 30% Not rejected [ 30%








Number of observations 1,386 1,386 264 1,122
Notes: Estimation period is 1998–2003
Standard errors of the long-run elasticities are computed using the delta method. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors in
parentheses unless otherwise indicated
*** Indicates significance at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%
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We have explored with different additional instru-
ments (the lagged value of sales in logarithms, the
Federal incremental tax credit rate, the ratio of log
assets over log employees and the ratio of growth in
output over growth in employment). In each case the
test of overidentifying restrictions was rejected. We
thus conclude that our instruments are rather weak, but
that at least they fulfill the overidentifying restrictions.
The speed of adjustment in the desired R&D stock k
is equal to 0.74 for small firms and 0.57 for large firms,
although statistically speaking they are not signifi-
cantly different from each other. The short-run price
elasticity of R&D is -0.14 for small firms and not
significantly different from zero for large firms. It may
be that large firms are not very price responsive, but it
may also be that our sample size is too small for large
firms to yield significant coefficients. For the whole
sample, however, the short-run price elasticity is
significantly different from zero and lower than for the
subsample of small firms. Small firms do hence seem
to be somewhat more price responsive than large firms.
The long-run price elasticity r is equal to -0.19 for
small firms and -0.14 for the whole sample. The long-
run output price elasticity is equal to 0.03 for small
firms and 0.07 for large firms. From the constant term
in the regression we can recover the estimated R&D
depreciation rate, which turns out to be between 17 and
27%, thus not far away from our ad hoc choice of 15%.
We have also experimented with an alternative
modeling of the dynamics in the R&D investment
by specifying an error-correction model with an
autoregressive distributed lag specification ADL(1, 1)
following Mairesse and Mulkay (2004). This speci-
fication does not assume a particular type of
adjustment as we do in the above model. However,
the alternative model did not yield a significant price
elasticity of R&D. Maybe a higher order lagged
specification would be required, but our short time
interval did not allow us to do this. Finally, we could
think of estimating a different sensitivity to R&D tax
credits between small and large firms by exploiting a
regression discontinuity design, in the sense that the
user cost of R&D would be lower for small firms that
benefit from more generous R&D tax credits. The
number of firms falling in a close neighbourhood of
the discontinuity in the R&D tax credit schedule,
some falling just above and some just below $2 ML
of R&D wages, was too small to find good matches to
compare the treatment effect of both types of firm.
6 Measuring effectiveness of R&D
To evaluate the effectiveness of the whole R&D tax
incentive program, we compare the present situation
with a fictive scenario where the government changes
part of the R&D tax incentive scheme. In the absence
of a proper cost–benefit calculation, including all
indirect costs and benefits related to such a program
(administration costs, opportunity costs and external-
ities), the usual way to assess the effectiveness of
R&D tax incentives consists in computing the so-
called ‘‘bang for the buck’’ (BFTB). By that is meant
how much private R&D increases per dollar of R&D
tax receipts foregone. If it is greater than 1, R&D tax
incentives are considered to be effective in stimulat-
ing additional R&D; a value smaller than 1 means
that part of the money received from tax incentives
substitutes for private financing.
We start from an old scenario where firms invest in
R&D every year to keep the R&D stock constant and/
or to expand that stock. In the new scenario the
government decides to increase the tax incentives,
which leads to a decrease in the user cost of R&D and
to increases in the R&D stock of knowledge until a new
desired R&D stock is reached. As firms invest more in
R&D, government needs to spend more on R&D tax
incentives. In Table 5 we describe the evolution of the
flows and stocks of R&D before and after the change in
R&D tax credits (the stocks and flows in the new
scenario are denoted by *). In principle, given our
assumed partial adjustment process, it takes until
infinity to reach the new steady state, but in practice the
new optimal stock is reached after 15 to 20 years.
To find out how much R&D arises from an R&D
tax incentive scheme, we have to compute the
differences in R&D flows (or expenditures) from
period 1 onwards till infinity between the two
scenarios, where the flows of each additional year
are discounted by 1/(1 ? r) vis-a`-vis the previous




















 Du0Ri= 1 þ rð Þt1 ð10Þ
12 See Lokshin and Mohnen (2007) for a detailed derivation of
(10).









where -rk is the estimated short-run user cost elasticity
of R&D stock in the first period, k is the estimated partial
adjustment coefficient, d is the depreciation rate of the
R&D stock, taken to be 15%, r is the risk-free interest
rate, taken to be on average 3%, and where the user cost
elasticity, common to all firms of a given size class and
constant over time, is converted to a marginal effect for
period t using the optimal R&D stock and the user cost
of R&D of period t.
For every dollar of private R&D expenditure, the
government supports a fraction of it by giving tax
incentives in proportion to the wage and salary costs for
researchers, the fraction of R&D carried out by a public
research centre, the fraction carried out in a research
consortium, the fraction of pre-competitive research or the
increments of R&D with respect to a base year. Let us
denote the fraction of the private R&D so supported by the
tax incentive programforfirm iatyear tbyc1Rit þ c2DRit,
where c1 is the R&D tax credit rate in proportion of the
level of R&D and c2 the rate in proportion of the
increase in R&D. Appendix A explains in detail
the various rates that apply in Quebec. Table 6 lists for
every year the average user cost of R&D, the B-index
and its components, and what the user cost of R&D
would be without the R&D tax credit.
The total cost to the government to support the
R&D tax credit program is given by
X1
t¼1





c1 ~Rit þ c2D ~Rit
 
 c1Rit þ c2DRit
 =ð1þ rÞt1: ð12Þ
The BFTB is given by the ratio of (10) and (12). In
other words, we compute the ratio of the increases in
R&D for all the firms along the entire trajectories
towards their new steady states to the saving in
government costs to support R&D along those
trajectories, both appropriately discounted.13
In our computation of the BFTB, we use size-class
specific short and long-run estimated price elasticities
reported in Sect. 4. We use two size classes: small
firms with fewer than 250 employees, and large firms
with 250 and more employees. We report each time
the BFTB computed for all firms with the specificities
in the tax scheme that pertain to them and with their
own price elasticities. We also report the BFTB
separately for small and large firms.
We run the following two experiments. In the first we
increase the level-based provincial tax incentives (c1) by
10% (all rates appearing in PL and PO are increased by
10%), in the other we increase the increment-based
provincial R&D tax credit (c2) by 10%. The result of the
first experiment is plotted in Fig. 1. For small firms the
BFTB, i.e. the ratio of cumulative additional R&D to
cumulative government expenses to support R&D, starts
at a value much higher than 1 and slowly drops to a value
that stays above 1 even after 20 years. Hence, for small
firms it is beneficial to support R&D by tax incentives.
More R&D gets created than it costs the government to
support it even after 20 years. For large firms, however,
the BFTB starts at 3, but falls below 1. Already after
Table 5 Trajectory of R&D flows and stocks under two scenarios
Periods Old scenario New scenario (after a change in the R&D tax credits)
R&D flow R&D stock R&D flow R&D stock
0 R0 K0 R0 K0
1 R1 = dK0 ? (K1 - K0) K1 ~R1 ¼ dK0 þ ~K1  K0
 
~K1 ¼ K1 þ oK1=ou1R
 
Du1R
2 R2 = dK1 ? (K2 - K1) K2 ~R2 ¼ d ~K1 þ ~K2  ~K1
 
~K2 ¼ ~K1 þ K2  K1ð Þ þ oK2=ou1R
 
Du1R
3 R3 = dK2 ? (K3 - K2) K3 ~R3 ¼ d ~K2 þ ~K3  ~K2
 
~K3 ¼ ~K2 þ K3  K2ð Þ þ oK3=ou1R
 
Du1R
4    
t Rt = dKt - 1 ? (Kt - Kt - 1) Kt ~Rt ¼ d ~Kt1 þ ~Kt  ~Kt1
 
~Kt ¼ ~Kt1 þ Kt  Kt1ð Þ þ oKt=ou1R
 
Du1R
Notes: The derivative qKj/quR represents the change in desired R&D stock that occurs j - 1 periods after the change in the user cost of R&D
caused by a change in the tax incentives in period 0 (Du0R). For simplicity, here the firm subscript i has been omitted
13 Because of the unbalanced nature of our sample, t0 is
different for every firm. We take it to be the last year a firm is
observed in the sample. In the simulation for the removal of the
incremental R&D tax credit, we take as the reference year the
last year this tax credit was in effect.
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7 years the cumulative additional R&D no longer covers
the cumulative government costs to support this R&D. If
we take all the firms in our sample, the BFTB falls below
the bar of 1 after 13 periods. Thus, if we consider the
whole adjustment towards a new steady state, the level-
based R&D tax incentives do not come out as very
effective. The reason for this ineffectiveness is that level-
based tax incentives contain a deadweight loss, namely
the tax support on the R&D that would be done in the
absence of all support. The importance of the deadweight






 þ ~c1  c1ð ÞRit þ ~c2ðD ~Rit DRitÞ

þð~c2  c2ÞDRit= 1þ rð Þt1: ð13Þ
The second term represents the deadweight loss
connected to a change in the level-based R&D tax credit.
In percentage of the total, the deadweight loss converges
to 68% for small firms and to 82% for large firms.
In the second experiment we increase only the
incremental-based R&D tax credit by 10%, i.e. the
rate appearing in PI. In this case, there can also be a
deadweight loss, the fourth term in (13), to the extent
that we do not start from an initial steady state, but
that some R&D investment was already planned
before the tax change. However, this deadweight loss
is likely to be small. By simulating the effect of the
tax change on R&D and government support for
R&D for a period of 20 years, we find that the bang
for the buck is about 2.98 for small firms and 2.79 for
large firms. The incremental R&D tax credit is much
more effective than the level based tax credit, and its
effectiveness does not vary much by firm size.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of R&D
tax incentives in Quebec, using manufacturing firm
data originating from R&D surveys, annual surveys
of manufactures and administrative data. The data
cover the years 1997 to 2003. We estimate the price
responsiveness of R&D from a factor demand model
for R&D with partial adjustment towards the steady
state. From the estimated price elasticities we com-
pute the bang for the buck for changes in the level-
based and in the increment-based provincial R&D tax
credits. We are especially interested in comparing the
effectiveness of R&D tax incentives for small and
large firms.
Small firms in Quebec are slightly more respon-
sive than large firms to price changes in the user cost
of R&D driven by various kinds of tax credits aimed
at stimulating R&D. Their estimated price elasticity
of R&D investment is 0.14 in the short run and 0.19
in the long run (in absolute value). The estimated
short-run elasticities are in line with those estimated
by Bernstein (1986), 0.13, and Dagenais et al. (2004),
0.07, for Canada. The long-run elasticities are larger
in in those studies (0.30 and 1.09, respectively)
because of a faster estimated adjustment speed. Our
estimated bang for the buck differs sizeably from
those estimated by Hall (1993) and Mairesse and
Mulkay (2004) on US and French data, respectively.
Apart from possible differences in modeling and in
the definition of the bang for the buck, the main
reason for their much higher estimated effectiveness
ratios (above 2) is likely to be due to the exclusive
use of incremental R&D tax credits in France (until
recently) and the United States. Our results on the
differences between small and large firms regarding
their sensitivities to R&D tax credits confirm the
results on Dutch firms reported in Lokshin and
Mohnen (2007).
We show that there is a deadweight loss associated
with level-based R&D tax incentives that is partic-
ularly acute for large firms. For small firms it is not
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Fig. 1 Evolution of the
bang for the buck when
increasing by 10% the
level-based provincial rate
of R&D tax credit
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sizeable enough to overcome the R&D additionality,
at least not during quite a number of years after the
initial tax change. Incremental R&D tax credits do
not suffer from this deadweight loss and are from that
perspective preferable to level-based tax incentives.
If it wants to run an efficient fiscal policy in
support of R&D, the province of Quebec would be
advised to continue using both the incremental R&D
tax credit and the level-based tax credits in favour of
small firms. It is precisely small firms that have
difficulty in getting outside financing for their R&D
efforts. Of course, effectiveness is not the only nor
the ultimate goal in giving R&D tax credits. An
important consideration is the social rate of return on
tax-supported R&D. It would be interesting in future
work to compare the social returns on government
supported R&D via tax credits and direct subsidies,
on government supported and non-supported R&D,
and on R&D support for large and small firms.
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Appendix
Construction of the user cost of R&D
The user cost of R&D is given by uRi ¼ pRðr þ dÞBit,
where pR is the R&D deflator, r is the opportunity
cost of funds, d is the R&D depreciation rate, and B is




1  PLi;t  POi;t  PIi;t  FCi;t
 PDi;t  FDi;t

where PLi;t; POi;t; PIi;t; FCi;t; PDi;t; FDi;t are defined
as follows:
• PL: Quebec’s SR&ED tax credit and superde-
ductions for salaries and wages




































































– For large firms (assets [ 50,000,000)
PLi;t ¼ wLi;t ð1  D1i;tÞc2pL;t þ D1i;ts2L;tsp;t
h i
• PO: Quebec’s tax credits and superdeductions for
university research, pre-competitive research and
consortium research
POi;t ¼ð:8wUni;t þ wPri;t þ wCoi;t  sEi;tÞ
 ð1  D2i;tÞcpO;t þ D2i;tspO;tsp;t
 
This holds for small as well as for large firms. In the
case of tax credit and superdeductions for university
research, eligible expenditures are fixed at 80% of the
value of sub-contracted work.
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• PI: Quebec’s incremental tax credit
PIi;t ¼










ð1  wBi;tnÞ=ð1 þ rÞn
#)
• FC: federal SR&ED tax credit
– Small firms (assets \ 25,000,000)
For federal SR&ED tax credit, eligible expendi-
tures are current R&D expenditures and machinery
and equipment expenditures.
– Medium-sized firms: 25,000,000 \ assets
\ 50,000,000
where,
c1;1f ;t ¼ c1f ;t 
Asseti;t  25000000
 








– Large firms (assets [ 50,000,000)




• PD: Quebec’s R&D expensing




• FD: federal R&D expensing
FDi;t ¼





We assume that all firms are profitable, i.e. that they
are able to take full advantage of all R&D tax credits
and deductions. PLi,t, POi,t and PIi,t are obtained not
by the above formulas, but by dividing the observed
tax credit payments corresponding to these items by
the corresponding R&D. FCi,t is computed using the
statutory tax credit rates as in the above formula.
Table 6 decomposes the user cost of R&D into its
various components. All symbols and some key
parameter values are given in Table 7.
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Table 7 Symbols and some parameter valuesa
Variable Value Description
Asseti,t Asset of firm i in year t
cf
1 35% First bracket rate for federal SR&ED tax credit
cf
2 20% Second bracket rate for federal SR&ED tax credit
cpI 15% Quebec’s incremental R&D tax credit rate
cpL
1 1997–2002: 40% First bracket rate for Quebec’s salaries of researchers tax credit
2003: 35%
cpL
1,1 1997–2002: 40 to 20% First bracket variable rate for Quebec’s salaries of researchers tax credit applying
to firms with assets between CAN $25,000,000 and CAN $50,000,0002003: 35 to 17.5%
cpL
2 1997–2002: 20% Second bracket rate for Quebec’s salaries of researchers tax credit
2003: 17.5%
cPo 1997–2002: 40% Quebec’s tax credit rate for university research, precompetitive research
and dues paid to consortium2003: 35%
D1i,t D1i,t = 1 R&D performer claimed superdeduction for salaries
D1i,t = 0 R&D performer claimed tax credit for salaries
D2i,t D2i,t = 1 R&D performer claimed superdeduction for university, precompetitive or consortium research
D2i,t = 0 R&D performer claimed tax credit for university, precompetitive or consortium research
D3i,t D3i,t = 1 R&D performer claimed superdeduction based on the increase in R&D expenditures
D3i,t = 0 R&D performer claimed tax credit based on the increase in R&D expenditures
Rf CAN $2,000,000 First bracket ceiling for federal SR&ED tax credit
Ri,t Total R&D spending of firm i in year t
Rp CAN $2,000,000 First bracket ceiling for Quebec’s salaries of researchers ‘tax credit’
si,t
E Proportion of Quebec’s subsidies for equipment in total R&D of firm i in year t
spI,t 190% Quebec’s superdeduction incremental rate
spL,,t
1 460% First bracket rate for Quebec’s superdeduction for salaries and wages
spL,,t
1,1 Between 460 and 230% First bracket variable rate for Quebec’s superdeduction for salaries and wages
applying to firms with assets between CAN $25 ML and 50 ML
spL,,t
2 230% Second bracket rate for Quebec’s superdeduction for salaries and wages
spO,,t 460% Quebec’s superdeduction for university, pre-competitive and consortium research
h Applied in 1999: 125% Depreciation deduction rate of the acquisition costs of machinery and equipment
Table 6 Annual average user cost of R&D, 1997–2003 (all firms)
Year Firms PRt(r ? d) PLit POit PIit PCit FCit Bit ur,it ur,it w/o tax credits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1997 1,168 0.172 0.249 0.002 0.000 0.251 0.209 0.516 0.089 0.168
1998 1,265 0.183 0.243 0.003 0.000 0.246 0.208 0.523 0.096 0.179
1999 1,304 0.187 0.267 0.003 0.000 0.270 0.217 0.485 0.091 0.182
2000 1,909 0.197 0.271 0.005 0.050 0.326 0.197 0.462 0.091 0.194
2001 2,092 0.166 0.288 0.002 0.058 0.349 0.207 0.405 0.067 0.159
2002 2,400 0.176 0.299 0.002 0.057 0.357 0.208 0.393 0.069 0.169
2003 2,657 0.179 0.269 0.001 0.055 0.325 0.220 0.417 0.075 0.172
Note: ur,it, The user cost of R&D in column (9) is the product of column (2) and Bit, the B-index in column (8). PLit, POit, PIit, FCit
and the Bit are described above. PCit in column (6) is the sum of columns (3) to (5), i.e. all forms of R&D tax credits in Quebec.
Column (10) is the user cost of R&D without provincial and federal R&D tax credits
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